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In the face of mounting hyperinflation in the 1970s and 1980s, Israel underwent a 
stabilization program focused on reducing the size of its public sector. The principles of the 
program, influenced heavily by neoliberal thinking, were a radical shift away from the 
collectivist ethos Israel had been built on. This paper focuses on the impact of the ensuing 
privatization of infrastructure-related state assets. Given the primacy of these assets to the 
public’s standard of living, infrastructure is of particular interest to any government. As 
Israel moved away from state ownership, it involved the private sector to various degrees. In 
telecommunications, the privatization of government company Bezeq was imperfectly 
executed, resulting in economic concentration that mirrors wealth inequality found in other 
parts of Israeli society. In water, Israel utilized more limited forms of privatization to greater 
success. The national water carrier, Mekorot, operates as a government company, but may 
sell a minority stake. Doing so would provide liquidity while maintaining the state’s 
decision-making authority over a scarce resource. Similarly, the use of public-private 
partnerships in major desalination plants has balanced the risk between the public and 
private sectors, tapping into private sector expertise while guaranteeing sustainable water 
output. The three cases studied demonstrate different approaches to economic liberalization 
in essential assets. For the most part, Israel’s modes of privatization, at least in 
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The fact that infrastructure investment is often referred to as “nation-building” speaks to 
its significance. The roads, bridges, water systems, and telecommunication networks that most 
citizens of developed countries take for granted play a fundamental role in shaping economic 
development and quality of life. In building and maintaining these critical assets, governments 
take on immense responsibility and commensurate risk. Still, it is not obvious that governments 
should shoulder these responsibilities and risks entirely on their own. Many countries have 
employed the private sector to various degrees, transferring portions of economic risk to private 
enterprises. 
For private investors, core infrastructure, defined as “assets for which the cash flows to 
equity owners is forecastable with a low margin of error” have a growing appeal.  These 1
essential assets hold the appeal of stable, reliable cash flows. More so than other real assets like 
real estate or commodities, infrastructure assets are vital regardless of the larger economic 
environment, providing investors with low volatility in the face of an economic downturn. 
Infrastructure sectors, including transportation, communications, electricity, energy, and water 
and sewage, service needs that persist regardless of the closing price of the S&P 500. In a 
recession, consumers cut spending in many areas, but generally they do not turn off electricity to 
their stoves or stop using telecom services to communicate. Moreover, the current low-interest 
rate environment, intensified by central bank cuts in response to the coronavirus pandemic, has 
made debt cheaper, potentially allowing investors to secure low financing rates for long-term 
infrastructure projects. The influx of private capital towards this asset class is particularly timely 




as governments worldwide look to reinvest in their national infrastructure to the tune of $57 
trillion over the next fifteen years ​.   2
Still, determining the appropriate role of private capital in national infrastructure is not an 
easy task. In studying how governments shape policy to maintain public interest while 
privatizing, the case of Israel is particularly interesting. It tells the story of a nation built on 
social-democratic values that transitioned to a free enterprise system with the global wave of 
neoliberalism following the end of the Cold War. As it opened its economy and reduced the role 
of the public sector, Israel introduced the private sector to its core infrastructure sectors in a 
variety of forms. This paper studies three of those forms: a full privatization in the case of 
telecommunications, a potential minority privatization of the national water company, and 









2 Palter, Robert, and Pohl Herbert. "Money Isn't Everything (but We Need $57 Trillion for Infrastructure)." 





A New World Order 
The Cold War and ideological victor 
In a broad sense, the Cold War was an ideological fight between liberal democracy and 
capitalism on one hand and Marxism-Leninism and centralization on the other. From the 
Nixon- ​Khrushchev ​ “kitchen debate” to proxy wars fought globally, the fundamental question 
loomed large: which system would prevail? The end of the Cold War answered that question. 
With the fall of the USSR, two alternatives for structuring society turned into one. The zeitgeist 
of the political moment was perhaps best captured by Francis Fukuyama in his seminal essay, 
“The End of History?”. In it, he argues that liberalism overcame two major challenges: fascism 
in World War II and communism in the Cold War. He takes the fact that there was neither an 
elimination of ideology nor a merger of ideologies to claim “victory of economic and political 
liberalism”.  The essay notes that these ideas are compatible but not guaranteed–it is not obvious 3
that economic liberalism will lead to political liberalism. Indeed, the application of economic 
liberalism without democratic structures in the Middle East and Africa soon led to crony 
capitalism. Taken together, however, Fukuyama asserted that this brand of western liberal 
democracy was the ultimate destiny of humanity.  
This idea was echoed by the major international economic institutions of the day. 
Without the USSR as an ideological counter, the neoliberal organizations established after World 
War II became hegemonic. Both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were born 
out of the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. Initially, the IMF was meant to regulate exchange 
rates and facilitate trade, while the World Bank was supposed to lend to Western European 




government to rebuild after the war. The missions of both organizations gradually evolved to 
include global economic development. Given that voting power is determined by capital 
contribution to each organization, both organizations have come to be dominated by the Group 
of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States).   4
As tensions rose between the United States and the USSR, both sides used foreign aid as 
a strategic tool, either extending aid to form alliances or withholding it to punish undesirable 
actions.  Following the Cold War, when they could no longer leverage the political animosity 5
between the Americans and Soviets for economic aid, developing nations had only one option: 
turn to the United States and/or the international institutions dominated by neoliberal ideology.  
While neoliberalism is an amorphous term, it has discernible economic goals: free 
markets, free trade, and the proliferation of private enterprise in the name of increasing consumer 
choice.  When applied to development, the IMF conceptualized neoliberalism along two major 6
ideas: (1) increased competition and (2) a smaller role for the state.  In practice, the IMF and 7
World Bank used their funds to guide international development along the lines of their vision of 
a neoliberal future. The IMF in particular extended loans to countries in economic distress with 
strict caveats. Through these ‘Structural Adjustment Programs’, the IMF required loan recipients 
to restructure their economies along specific lines: deregulation and the opening of domestic 
markets to increase competition and privatization and austerity to limit the role of government.  8
The World Bank operated under a similar framework, extending development loans for specific 
4 The Thistle​. "The IMF and the WORLD BANK: Puppets of the Neoliberal Onslaught." September 26, 
2000. https://www.mit.edu/~thistle/v13/2/imf.html.  
5 Williams, Victoria. "Foreign Aid." In ​Britannica​. https://www.britannica.com/topic/foreign-aid.  
6 ​The Thistle​. "The IMF and the WORLD BANK” 
7 Ostry, Jonathan D., Prakash Loungani, and Davide Furceri. "Neoliberalism: Oversold?" ​Finance and 




projects that it deemed critical for economic growth. If a country refused to abide by these 
criteria, it would be hard pressed to find an alternative: private lenders generally looked to the 
IMF’s actions in their due diligence.  For most of the world, embracing neoliberalism was the 9
most viable path forward.  
In this larger context, Israel found itself facing a spiral of inflation in the late 1970s. Still, 
it was not obvious that Israel would readily adopt neoliberalism. Even before statehood, the 
community that would form Israel was deeply collectivist. Cultural legacies and the realities of 
war had only deepened a collectivist ethic and grown the reach of the state.  
 
Israel: A history of collectivism  
Israel was founded as the national homeland of the Jewish people on the principle that 
Jews could not live safe, normal lives as minorities in other societies. The guiding principles of 
the Zionist movement, which spearheaded early Jewish settlement in mandatory Palestine and 
became a prominent ideological force in the founding of the state, were necessarily collectivist. 
These ideas around the preservation of the community and the necessity of organizing centrally 
defined early policy and remained pervasive after statehood in 1948.  
Although anti-Semitism had been prevalent in Europe for centuries, the nineteenth 
century brought particular violence. Russian ​pogroms ​, organized massacres of Jews, in 
1881-1882 had already driven refugees to then-Ottoman controlled Palestine. This first ​aliyah ​, or 
9 ​The Thistle​. "The IMF and the WORLD BANK” 
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wave of immigration, brought around 35,000 Jews to Palestine, prior to the existence of an 
organized Zionist movement.  10
While ideas of Jewish sovereignty in the face of violence had existed before, Theodore 
Herzl is credited with putting forward Zionism as a cohesive ideology and political force. An 
Austrian journalist raised in a secular manner, Herzl hoped that Jews would be able to assimilate 
into European society. In 1897, he organized the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, 
arguing that the Jewish people could only thrive in a territory of their own. In his words, the goal 
of Zionism was to “create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law”. 
Inherent in this philosophy was the idea that Jews would have to be self-sufficient. A history of 
persecution in Europe had convinced Herzl that the Jewish people could not rely on any 
non-Jewish government for protection.  
By 1914, at the end of the second ​aliyah ​, about 90,000 Jews were living in Palestine, 
spread across forty-three agricultural settlements. Whereas the first wave of immigrants had 
settled on ​moshavot, ​villages of independent farmers, the second wave from 1904 to 1914 
organized themselves into ​kibbutzim, ​collective agricultural communities.  The ​kibbutz ​was a 11
manifestation of Zionist ideology–a self-sufficient commune tied together by the dedication and 
hard work of its members. 
If Theodor Herzl was the theorist of Zionism, the project needed an executor. David 
Ben-Gurion, who immigrated to Palestine from present-day Poland in 1906, would fit the bill. 
Ben-Gurion quickly became the leader of the ​yishuv​, the Jewish population in Palestine prior to 
10 Jewish Virtual Library. "Immigration to Israel." Jewish Virtual Library. 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-first-aliyah-1882-1903.  
11 Barnavi, Elie, and Miriam Eliav-Feldon. ​A Historical Atlas of the Jewish People: From the Time of the 
Patriarchs to the Present​. New York: Schocken Books,1999.  
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statehood. At the top of his mind was concern that claims of Jewish sovereignty over the territory 
could be disputed if areas were sparsely populated. Settlers needed to establish control of the 
land if they were to ever form their own national home. Moreover, population concentration 
could be a tactical weakness. If growing hostility from neighboring Arab governments 
heightened to military campaigns, it would be easy to wipe out Jewish ambitions completely if 
the population remained clustered. The key to survival seemed to be dispersion. But to convince 
people to move, they needed to know they would have access to basic infrastructure. With 
private enterprises unlikely to take on such a risky and uncertain project, the proto-government 
structures had to provide.   12
Early governing ​ ​organizations were dominated by the Labor movement, which itself was 
led by Ben-Gurion. Labor was influenced by the tenets of Zionism and organized accordingly. 
The ​Histadrut​, Federation of Labor, was formed in 1920 as a centralized trade union but 
effectively controlled a large portion of the economy. It took on political and military roles as 
well, controlling land, labor, and capital in addition to providing housing and employment ​.  ​By 13
the 1930s, 75% of Jewish workers were members.  The Jewish Agency, formed to cooperate 14
with the British Mandatory Authority in the wake of the 1917 Balfour Declaration, took charge 
of funding. These institutions were guided by the World Zionist Organization, established in 
1897 to organize the creation of a Jewish homeland.  
12 Senor, Dan, and Saul Singer. ​Start-up Nation: The Story of Israel's Economic Miracle​. New York: 
Twelve, 2011.  
13 Sorkin, David. "Israel." In ​Jewish Emancipation: A History across Five Centuries ​, 334-45. N.p.: 
Princeton University Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvdmx0kk.30.  
14 Koreh, Michal, and Daniel Béland. "The Fiscal Path to the State of Israel: Social Policy and State 




Formed in 1901, the Jewish National Fund was tasked with the most critical objective on 
the path to statehood: acquiring land. Throughout Ottoman and British rule, the JNF bought up 
land from absentee Arab landowners, at times buying at above the fair market value to prevent 
land from staying in Arab hands. In addition to the political practicality of land ownership under 
a centralized organization in the ​yishuv​, public ownership had an idealistic allure. Public 
ownership echoed the collectivist vision of Zionism, particularly as it enabled the formation of 
moshavot ​and ​kibbutzim ​.   15
As the JNF expanded, it implemented Herzl’s insistence on self-sufficiency, not allowing 
Arab peasants to work on Jewish land. A like-minded Ben-Gurion is to have said “we will know 
we have become a normal country when Jewish thieves and Jewish prostitutes conduct their 
business in Hebrew”. With this mentality, despite living under the same British mandatory law, 
the Jewish and Arab economies developed separately. Subsequent ​aliyah ​ led to prolonged 
economic vitality, but due to the lack of integration, by 1947, the Jewish sector’s national 
domestic product was 2.5 times larger than the Arab sector’s.   16
 
Immigration and centralization 
The Zionist project needed people to populate the land in order to develop legitimacy. If 
Herzl’s thesis was correct, Jews across Europe would need to immigrate to a Jewish homeland to 
escape anti-Semitism. Indeed, from 1948 to 1951, after statehood, immigrants doubled the 
15 Leon, Dan. "The Jewish National Fund: How the Land Was 'Redeemed.'" ​Palestine-Israel Journal of 
Politics, Economics & Culture​ 12/13, no. 4/1 (2005): 115-23. Academic Search Complete (21401286).  




Jewish population ​.  ​With waves of mass migration, Israel would have to develop infrastructure 17
to ease absorption. The collectivist Zionist vision, combined with the pressures of 
accommodating tens of thousands of people in short periods of time meant that the government 
took charge of infrastructure investment and planning, with little room for private sector actors.  
Immigration is generally broken into distinct waves, or ​aliyot​. Each wave brought new 
demographics to the ​ yishuv​, transforming the politics of the community. The first ​aliyah, ​from 
1881 to 1882, included refugees of the Russian pogroms and numbered over 35,000. The second 
aliyah ​ (1904-1914) brought around 40,000 Jews, largely the Zionists who would direct the early 
yishuv​. The third ​aliyah ​ (1919-1923) is often considered a continuation of the second. The fourth 
aliyah (1924-1929) was the result of anti-Jewish policies following an economic crash in Poland. 
Many of these immigrants were middle class small business owners, who established shops in 
the ​yishuv​ and spurred economic and industrial development. Already, problems with absorption 
were beginning to manifest: of the 82,000 who immigrated, 23,000 left. The fifth ​aliyah 
(1929-1939) followed from the rise of the Nazis in Germany. This influx consisted of many 
educated professionals. By the end of this wave, the ​yishuv ​numbered around 450,000.   18
Of the ​aliyot​, the immigration of Arab and Russian Jews were arguably the two most 
important waves in shifting Israeli identity away from its foundations in European Zionism. In 
1950, two years after statehood, the Law of Return was passed, under Israel’s first prime 
minister, David Ben-Gurion. The legislation codified the principle that every Jew has a right to 
immigrate to Israel. Arab Jews, in contrast to their European counterparts, felt no pressing need 
to leave their countries of origin. During the multiethnic Ottoman Empire, minority religions 
17 Hacohen, Dvora. "Immigration Policy in Israel - the Reality behind the Myth." ​Israel Studies Bulletin​ 14, 
no. 1 (1998): 1-8. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41805397.  
18 Jewish Virtual Library. "Immigration to Israel."  
11 
 
were tolerated and lived in relative peace with the Muslim majority. Under European colonizers, 
Jews often felt even more secure. The Jews who did migrate to the ​yishuv ​primarily did so for 
religious, rather than political, reasons. In the 1920s and 1930s, however, as Arab nationalism 
began to form in response to colonization, the status of Jews began to be threatened. By the 
1940s, the situation had gotten progressively worse. Arab governments resented Israeli 
statehood, viewing it as a sort of vestigial colonialism. Anger and violence was directed at Arab 
Jews, often referred to as ​mizrahim ​, within these countries, leading to a wave of immigration to 
Israel. Around the same time, the Holocaust survivors were immigrating as well. The nascent 
state struggled with absorption, leading to a shortage of housing, high unemployment, and health 
problems. Many new immigrants, especially Arab Jews, lived in transitory areas, often at the 
periphery of cities.  Decades later, Likud would tap into the resentment created by these 19
inequities to transform the ​mizrahi ​population into a powerful voting bloc.  
In the 1990s, the largest wave of immigration in Israel’s history would shape the 
country’s character in a different direction. World War II had liberated the concentration camps, 
but violent anti-Semitism still existed and sharpened under Joseph Stalin. Although physical 
violence at scale stopped after Stalin’s death, campaigns that targeted Jews for “economic 
crimes” persisted.  When the Soviet Union finally lifted migration restrictions on Jews, 20
hundreds of thousands immigrated, in all adding about one million to Israel’s population of five 
million. These new immigrants were highly educated and tended to be secular. When settled, 
they experienced more upward mobility than the rest of the population ​.   21
19 Hacohen, Dvora. "Immigration Policy in Israel - the Reality behind the Myth." 
20 Barnavi, Elie, and Miriam Eliav-Feldon. ​A Historical Atlas of the Jewish People. 
21 Tslil, Aloni, and Zeev Krill. "Intergenerational Mobility of Earnings in Israel." Last modified July 15, 
2017. https://issuu.com/dleventer/docs/tzlil_aloni_comment_on_intergenerat.  
12 
 
Culturally and politically, absorbing and assimilating massive waves of migrants was 
incredibly difficult for the state. However, in addition to tipping the scales in the demographic 
balance between Arabs and Jews on the contested land, immigration brought economic growth. 
The table below illustrates the impacts of integrated ​olim ​(immigrants who made ​aliyah ​) through 
distinct time periods.   22
Exhibit 1.  
Aliyah and Growth, 1922, 2015 (annual percentage growth rates) 





















1922-1931 9.5 8.0 – – 7.8 
1932-1946 15.6 8.4 – – 3.0 
1947-1949 37.7 21.9 – – – 
1950-1951 26.1 20.0 – – 10.0 
1952-1963 19.4 4.0 12.8 11.6 4.9 
1964-1971 8.3 3.0 8.7 7.7 5.5 
1972-1982 7.6 2.1 6.1 7.7 0.8 
1983-1989 2.7 1.8 3.1 4.0 3.1 
1990-2001 16.5 3.0 7.0 4.7 2.5 
2002-2007 1.9 1.8 2.4 2.5 1.9 
2008-2015 1.8 2.0 3.4 3.2 1.3 
Source: Razin, 2017. Original data from Ben Porath (1985) for the years 1922-82. Central 
Bureau of Statistics (2016) and Bank of Israel (2016).  





In writing the Law of Return, the state had committed itself to developing the country for 
whichever Jews wanted to come. As a result, Israel saw massive capital investments, which 
spurred economic growth and set a precedent of government economic involvement. 
 
Military mobilization  
From the time of the ​yishuv​, the Jewish population in Palestine operated in a state of 
perpetual national insecurity. The wars of the Arab-Israeli conflict shaped the region culturally 
and politically. Domestically, the need to wage what were essentially wars for survival lead the 
government to intervene heavily economically, perpetuating the system of a large public sector 
for decades.  
With the British mandate effectively ending on May 15th, 1948, it was inevitable that the 
State of Israel’s declaration of independence, issued on midnight May 14th, 1948, would escalate 
Arab hostility to war. In Israel, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War that would follow was a war for the 
existential fate of the Jewish community. For this fledgling country to fight against an Arab 
coalition of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, the entire country would have to be mobilized.  
Militarily, the extent of mobilization was enormous: by November 1948, the census put 
the Jewish population at 713,000. The IDF estimated its forces to be 94,000. On the other hand, 
all the Arab armies together sent 68,000 men. Coinciding immigration waves helped the effort, 
and by the end of the war, recent immigrants constituted 20% of the Israel Defense Force’s 
personnel. ​ ​But the economy could not sustain a prolonged war. The new government quickly 
felt the strain of fighting a war of such scale, with the cost of local defense needs growing to be 
14 
 
33% of gross national product.  The severity of the war led the government to step in, directing 23
the economy to meet the needs of the fight. As Mordechai Settner, chairperson of Economic 
Department of the National Committee, put it:  
 
“The Yishuv is entering a struggle of its existence and future. This is a clear, as 
well as cruel reality for the present. In this struggle there is an important 
economic front, and only to the extent that we shall be successful in holding the 
line [economically], will we be able to hold firm in the overall struggle.” 
 
Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and Minister of Finance Eliezer Kaplan internalized 
the need for economic centralization, declaring the Defense Regime on October 2nd, 
1947. The subsequent wartime economy was characterized by full employment, limited 
imports, rising cost of living, and heavy government intervention. For instance, in 
November 1948 the Center for Economic Coordination was established, responsible for 
creating and administering a food rationing program.  
Israeli mobilization was ultimately effective, giving the new nation an upper hand 
in the conflict. In February 1949, armistice agreements were signed, delineating the 
borders that would exist until war broke out again in 1967. Recovering from the cost of 
the war, the state passed a new economic policy in 1952, devaluing the Israeli pound 
from an exchange rate of 2.80 USD/ ​I£ ​ to 1.40 USD/ ​I£ ​.  The plan also began to relax 24
23 Naor, Moshe. "Israel's 1948 War of Independence as a Total War." ​Journal of Contemporary History​ 43, 
no. 2 (2008): 241-57. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30036505.  
24 Jewish Telegraphic Agency. "Israel's New Economic Policy Clarified by Finance Minister." ​JTA Daily 
News Bulletin​, February 15, 1952, 1-2. 
  https://www.jta.org/1952/02/15/archive/israels-new-economic-policy-clarified-by-finance-minister.  
15 
 
price controls and eased active encouragement of new immigration to reduce the strain of 
absorption. From 1950 to 1965, real gross national product grew at an average annual rate 
of over 11%. This growth was fueled by a huge government investment program, made 
possible by United States aid, German reparations to individuals, the sale of Israeli 
government bonds abroad, and donations to the Jewish Agency (in charge of immigration 
absorption and agricultural settlement).  Nevertheless, the legacy of government 25
intervention, entrenched by the war, continued. Protectionist measures were enacted with 
the intention of accelerating import substitution industrialization (ISI), a policy to replace 
foreign imports with native industry.  
From 1946 to 1966, the government had completed most of the large-scale 
infrastructure projects, creating an opening to decrease government intervention and 
allow for private enterprise.  However, economic reforms were quickly sidelined with 26
the outbreak of the Six Day War. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser called for the 
removal of the United Nations Emergency Force stationed between the Egyptian and 
Israeli borders. As Egypt mobilized with Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, an attack appeared to be 
imminent. In the Israel, mass graves were dug to prepare for the fatalities; in the national 
imagination, war would be akin to a second Holocaust. Acting on intelligence from the 
CIA, the Israelis struck first on June 5th, effectively wiping out the Egyptian and Syrian 
air forces. This early strike was debilitating to the Arab armies, and by June 10th, Syria, 
the last holdout, had accepted the cease-fire.  
25 Halevi, Nadav. "A Brief Economic History of Israel." 
26 Senor, Dan, and Saul Singer. ​Start-up Nation. 
16 
 
Israel had done more than survive; it had captured the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, 
West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Now, to consolidate its territorial gains, the 
government once again set out to centrally develop infrastructure to link the new areas to 
the rest of Israel. This flood of investment stimulated the economy, with investments in 
construction equipment alone rising 725% from 1967 to 1968 ​.   27
Israeli settlers rushed to build houses in the West Bank and Gaza, territory that 
was technically occupied, but not part of Israel. The government built infrastructure to 
support these movements, and by 1973 there were seventeen settlements in the West 
Bank and seven in the Gaza Strip.  Transportation networks, in particular, were 28
reconfigured to integrate the new territories into Israel, with the state building new roads 
and highways to connect settlements in the occupied territories.  Today, settlements, 29
along with the roads and other infrastructure built for their communities control up to 
40% of the West Bank’s surface area ​.   30
 
The road to neoliberalism 
The euphoria that followed 1967 came to a crushing end when war between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors broke out again in 1973. The period from 1967 to 1970, referred to as the “war 
of attrition” had seen sporadic fighting between Israeli and Arab forces, but came to an end when 
27 Ibid. 




29 Abu-Ayyash, Abdul-Ilah. "Israeli Regional Planning Policy in the Occupied Territories." Journal of 
Palestine Studies 5, no. 3/4 (1976): 83-108. https://doi.org/10.2307/2536017. 
30 Tahhan, Zena. "The Naksa: How Israel Occupied the Whole of Palestine in 1967."  
17 
 
Anwar Sadat became president, following Nasser’s death. In contrast to Nasser, who had 
championed a bold, aggressive ideology of pan-Arabism that abhorred Israel, Sadat outlined 
more modest, pragmatic goals. After months of careful military planning, Egypt and Syria 
attacked Israel from two fronts on October 6th, on the holy day of Yom Kippur. Caught by 
surprise, Israel turned to the United States for help. The first country to extend ​de facto 
recognition of Israeli independence in 1945, the United States was initially hesitant to extend aid 
but quickly supplied arms through airlifts following news that the Soviet Union was resupplying 
Egypt and Syria. By the end of October, the United Nations adopted a resolution calling for the 
end of fighting, leading to a ceasefire on October 25th. Militarily, Israel had won the war. But 
psychologically, the nation felt far from victorious. Israelis suffered three thousand fatalities and 
had lost swathes of the Sinai. In response to criticisms of under-preparation, Labor party prime 
minister Golda Meir resigned in April of 1974.  
Economically, the disaster was just beginning. The government’s struggle to fund the war 
and maintain wages in its wake contributed to hyperinflation and a period of economic 
uncertainty termed the “lost decade”. Inflation rose from 2% in 1967 to 500% in 1984, straining 
the government and compromising quality of life.  It would not be until 1985 that stabilization 31
efforts transformed the country’s economic mindset and paved the way for the privatization of 
infrastructure.  
The Yom Kippur War had seen the first powerful use of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC)’s economic weapon: the oil embargo. Imposed in retaliation for the 
United States’ decision to resupply the Israeli military, the oil embargo banned petroleum 
31 Fischer, Stanley. "The Israeli Stabilization Program, 1985-86." ​The American Economic Review​ 77, no. 2 
(1987): 275-78. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1805463.  
18 
 
exports to countries that supported Israel in the war while simultaneously cutting production 
levels. The acute impact of the embargo in the United States was immortalized in iconic images 
of lines of cars at gas stations while the owners put up “Sorry NO Gas” signs. Inflation spiked 
globally, but in the coming years, Israel would experience hyperinflation that could not solely be 
explained by the effect of the embargo.  
As with previous wars, 1973 had required mass mobilization of the population. Most of 
the labor force was pulled into the IDF for up to six months, stalling economic activity and 
dampening the country’s growth. Despite economic activity grinding to a halt, wages did not go 
down.  Since the 1940s, largely due to the enormous influence of the ​Histadrut​, wages had been 32
tied to inflation, measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). In the midst of the Yom Kippur 
War, the government kept up with this social contract, inflating wages and consequently driving 
up the national debt. Concurrently, defense expenditures climbed with the escalating war.  
Despite the end of the war, economic malaise would continue. Government intervention 
had the result of choking the country’s capital markets. In an effort to control capital, the state 
had taken charge of setting terms and interest rates for consumer and business credit. Pension 
funds and commercial banks were made to use their deposits to finance projects selected by the 
government. Due to both the fear of currency depreciation and the pride of maintaining a 
national currency, the foreign exchange market was tightly controlled. Holding an overseas bank 
account was illegal and currency could only be changed at banks, at a government-set exchange 
rate​.  ​Concurrently, indexation, which had historically been a boon to Israeli labor, increasingly 33
contributed to an inflationary spiral. As CPI rose, the ​Histadrut​ used its political weight to argue 




for higher wages. Anticipating that inflation would be even higher next month, labor argued for 
higher wages in the present, creating a loop of inflationary pressure exacerbated by expectations. 
  34
The situation grew increasingly untenable and reached a head in the 1977 elections. For 
the first time since 1968, the Israeli Labor Party would lose its position as the dominant party. 
The election was as much a vote against Labor as it was one for Likud. A survey from the period 
indicated that 81% of Israelis were dissatisfied with the management of the economy, a 
testament to the impact of hyperinflation on quality of life. In that context of economic struggle, 
a series of scandals, including misappropriation of public funds in 1976 and the discovery of 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s wife holding currency in a foreign bank account appeared 
particularly distasteful.   35
To its credit, Likud had seized upon a clever strategy of appealing to those who did not 
feel represented by Labor. By this time, ​mizrahi ​Jews constituted about half of the Jewish 
population, and over two-thirds of them voted for Likud, forming an important base for the party. 
Demographically, ​mizrahim ​ were less affluent and more religiously devout. They resonated with 
the populist messages of the Likud campaign, which made promises to extend additional 
government support and services to their communities. Likud found another source of support in 
younger Israelis, who had likely developed political consciousness around the Yom Kippur War 
and associated Labor with the bitter defeat.   36
34 Reuveny, Rafael. "Democracy, Credibility, and Sound Economics: The Israeli Hyperinflation." ​Policy 
Sciences ​ 30, no. 2 (1997): 91-111. Accessed January 14, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/4532401.  
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Despite the historic political shift, economic fortunes did not turn brighter immediately. 
In the two governments that presided from 1977 to 1984, Likud held small majorities and relied 
on tenuous coalitions formed with other parties to consolidate power. Exacerbated by the 
political environment, inflation accelerated further, going from 31% in 1976 to 375% in 1984.  37
While Likud focused on expanding settlements in the West Bank and Golan Heights, other 
parties that made up their coalition had different primary goals. National religious parties wanted 
stronger claims for biblical territories, ultra-orthodox parties pushed for financial support for 
religious education, and centrists advocated for investing within Israel’s 1967 borders. Various 
ministries pressured the Ministry of Finance to increase their budget allocations so that they 
could pursue these varied goals. They argued, much as ​Histadrut​ did, that the real value of their 
budgets lagged behind changes in CPI, again feeding into inflationary pressures. In addition to 
pacifying minority parties, Likud had its own promises to ​mizrahim ​to fulfill. In all, the political 
pressure to keep the coalition together necessitated greater spending, strongly disincentivizing 
bold action to address hyperinflation ​.   38
Hyperinflation was not the only issue coloring Israeli politics. Since the Camp David 
Accords in 1979, peace with Egypt had held and tensions with Syria and Jordan appeared to be 
cooling. In the summer of 1982, Likud Prime Minister Menachem Begin had launched 
“Operation Peace for Galilee”, a strike intended to root out Yasser Arafat and the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation, which was operating from Lebanon. While the IDF succeeded in 
forcing Arafat to flee to Tunisia, Israel drew international–and some domestic–criticism for the 
resulting loss of Palestinian life. Exhausted with the war, Begin abruptly resigned in the middle 




of the 10th Knesset’s term. In the early elections that followed, war in Lebanon and 
hyperinflation dominated the talking points. Without a clear winner in the July elections, it took 
until September for the new ‘national unity’ government to be formed. Compromising between 
Labor and Likud, which had won 44 and 41 seats, respectively, the new government appointed 
Labor’s Shimon Peres as Prime Minister and Likud’s Yitzhak Shamir as Foreign Minister. After 
two years, they would switch roles .  39
With a broad coalition less tied to political winds than a one-party majority Knesset 
would have been, Israel was finally in a position to help itself. And given the increasingly 
delicate economic situation, reform would have to come quickly. Spending had driven up the 
deficit and grown the national debt so much so that the government had come to make up 76% of 
GDP.  External debt had risen from 59% of GDP in 1977 to 75% in 1984.  As Peres took 40 41
office, American president Ronald Reagan offered a $1.5 billion grant to help Israel dig itself out 
of its financial hole. The US-Israeli relationship had grown progressively stronger over time, 
with the superpower using aid to Israel as a way to support its interests in the region. Against the 
backdrop of the Cold War, Israel was a useful counterbalance to Soviet allies including Egypt, 
Syria, Iraq, and Algeria.  Every time Israel proved its military strength, it was rewarded. Aid 42
increased 450% after 1967, another 800% after 1973, and another 400% in 1979, after the United 
States simultaneously lost an ally in Shah Reza Pahlavi to the Iranian Revolution and saw the 
39 "About the 1984 Elections." The Israel Democracy Institute. 
https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-elections-and-parties/elections/1984/.  
40 Arlosoroff, Meirav. "July 1, 1985: The Day Israeli Capitalism Was Born." ​Haaretz ​ (Israel), July 3, 2015. 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/.premium-july-1-1985-the-day-israeli-capitalism-was-born-1.537511
4. 
41 Krampf, Arie. ​The Israeli Path to Neoliberalism ​. Routledge, 2018. Digital file.  




victory of the right-wing, free-market-friendly Likud party in Israel.  Reading this historical 43
pattern, it was hardly a surprise that the United States would come to Israel’s aid when the 
country found itself in economic distress. But again, the United States would use this opportunity 
to continue to cultivate the Israel best aligned with American interests. As Secretary of State 
George Schultz made clear, aid was contingent on Israel making serious and dramatic changes to 
its financial operations.  
The first few efforts at addressing the issue resulted in ‘package deals’ between the 
government and ​Histadrut​. In November of 1984, a deal was reached in which ​Histadrut​ agreed 
to wage freezes. While inflation dropped to 4.5% per month over the next two months, the 
budget deficit had not seriously been addressed and inflation picked back up again, at a rate 
averaging 350% for the first half of 1985.  It became clear that achieving a sustainable level of 44
economic normalcy would require decisive–and likely painful–policy. As the head of the State 
Revenues Division, Yoram Gabay explained: 
 
 “The package deals tried to work through psychology and influence expectations. 
That’s bluffing. Psychology doesn’t work in economics, only real actions.”  45
 
Despite the irony of such a quote coming from the nation that would produce the most notable 
behavioral economists decades later, Gabay was correct in his assessment that the situation 
43 Zunes, Stephen. "Why the US Supports Israel." Institute for Policy Studies. Last modified May 1, 2002. 
https://ips-dc.org/why_the_us_supports_israel/.  
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would not improve without breaking the bargaining power of ​Histadrut​, which an article from 
the time described as the “single most powerful economy entity in the country”.  Rafael 46
Reuveny writes that three political factors had a role finally bringing about stabilization: (1) 
politicians formed a broad coalition that allowed them to act with the country’s long-term 
economic interests in mind, rather than their own political careers, (2) ​Histadrut​ and the business 
community came around to supporting major reform when the public no longer participated in 
demonstrations against budgetary cuts, and (3) the public believed the government’s efforts were 
credible and stopped anticipating increasingly higher inflation.   47
On July 1st, 1985, the government released the stabilization program. Among its major 
points, the plan included a $462 million budget cut, of which 40% had been allocated to 
subsidies, a 20% devaluation of the Israeli shekel, higher reserve ratios, and a prohibition of 
dollar-denominated savings accounts.  Monthly inflation rates fell, dropping to 11% in the third 48
quarter of 1985 and as low as 1% a year after.  The decisive and sharp action plan had 49
worked–Israel was pulled out of its economic slump. Moreover, the stabilization program had 
consequences for how the state would operate going forward. Crafted by Michael Bruno and 
Eitan Berglas, with help from neoliberal American advisors George Schultz, Herbert Stein, and 
Stanley Fischer, it marked a transformation in Israel’s attitude towards government intervention 
in the economy. The lesson of hyperinflation had been that the state was overgrown–in an effort 
to provide for the public, the government had extended itself too far. In addressing this 
46 Farrell, William. "Israel Turns to Milton Friedman." ​The New York Times ​, June 26, 1977. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1977/06/26/archives/israel-turns-to-milton-friedman.html.  
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overextension, the authors of the program instituted a new, distinctly neoliberal mindset to Israeli 
economic policy.  
In the capital market, the state relinquished its role in regulating credit availability by 
reducing the minimum required investment in government-approved long-term savings programs 
and government bonds. In financial markets, restrictions on international financial trade were 
lifted. Even ​Histadrut​, which had been an enormous force in Israeli political and economic 
activity transitioned away from its involvement in welfare programs and began operating as a 
traditional workers’ union. Unionization overall dropped, going from 80-90% in the early 1980s 
to 30-40% in the 2010s.  Across the economy, markets were opening up.  50
As the state pared back its responsibilities, it embarked on a privatization plan that would 
continue into the following decades. Of the thirteen largest government companies, which made 
up 96% of total government company income and 97% of government company assets, ten were 
in the infrastructure sector.  Throughout its political history, infrastructure had been an integral 51
part of consolidating Israeli territorial claims. As the Arab-Israeli conflict cooled, infrastructure 
continued to be a state priority for maintaining quality of life. Navigating the process of 
privatization would require balancing the public’s need for reliable access to services and the 
state’s need to divest from the capital intensity and risk of operating such businesses.  
The following case studies consider three forms of privatization: (1) the full privatization 
of a government monopoly in the case of Bezeq, the telecommunications company, (2) the 
proposed minority stake sale of a government company, Mekorot, the national water authority, 
and (3) the application of public-private-partnerships to develop desalination plants.  
50 Paz-Fuchs, Amir, Ronen Mandelkern, and Itzhak Galnoor, eds. ​The Privatization of Israel: The 




Bezeq – Fully privatizing a monopoly 
“Israel has enacted a series of economic reforms over the last twenty years that have 
fundamentally transformed our economy... All of these reforms will and are directed to one goal 
- to make Israel's economy freer, more competitive so that we can unleash the enormous 
potential that is in our people."  
Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister  
 
The deregulation and privatization of Bezeq were both undertaken haltingly, leading to 
mismatches between the company’s regulatory marketplace protections and its private 
ownership. The longer privatization took, the longer Bezeq retained its power, making it 
increasingly difficult to break its monopolies, particularly its most lucrative monopoly in 
domestic telecommunications. Today, Bezeq is a target of frustrations about economic 
concentration, a problem present throughout the larger Israeli economy.  
 
Establishing a conglomerate 
Founded in 1984 as a government company, Bezeq is Israel’s largest telecommunications 
company. Initially created to improve upon the inefficiency of the Ministry of Communications, 
which was previously responsible for installing and servicing phone lines, Bezeq expanded into 
other telecommunications subsegments over time. Today, the company’s activities can be broken 





1. Domestic Communications 
Domestic communications infrastructure continues to be Bezeq’s largest segment, 
making up 41% of revenue in FY 2018.  Today, the business provides internet infrastructure 52
services, basic telephony, and transmission and data communications. As of 2017, the company 
reported 1.9 million access lines across Israel, with a market share of 53% of the private 
telephony sector, and 72% of the business sector. Additionally, the company has installed over 
1.6 million high-speed retail and wholesale broadband lines, encompassing 70% of the market.   53
 
2. Cellular Communications  
Operated under subsidiary Pelephone Communications Ltd., cellular communications 
infrastructure offers package services that include basic cellular services, browsing and data 
communications services, and messaging. Furthermore, Pelephone offers content services such 
as anti-virus, cyber security, and a music library, IOT services for smart buildings, and roaming 
services for international travel. Complementing these services, the company also sells terminal 
equipment such as mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and more. Today, Pelephone services 
approximately 1.9 million subscribers, about 21.9% of the Israeli population. ,   54 55
In 1986, Israel awarded the first mobile phone network contract to Motorola Corporation, 
which, together with Bezeq, established Pelephone. The company lost its monopoly in 1994 
when the government granted a license to Cellcom in order to create a competitive market. 
52 "Bezeq Financial Statements." Table. FactSet. https://www.factset.com/.  
53Bezeq 2017 Q2 Investor Presentation​. 2017. 
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Cellcom won the license by promising prices that were 6.5% of what Pelephone was charging. 
Forced to adapt, Pelephone cut prices as well, although they remained above Cellcom’s. The 
following years saw additional operators enter the market, with licenses issued to Partner 
Communications in 1997 and MIRS Corporation in 2001.  In 2004, Bezeq acquired all of 56
Pelephone, following a change in regulations that had previously prevented Bezeq from 
becoming the sole owner. In a statement, Chairwoman Miki Mazar described the purchase as 
critical to turning Bezeq into “a communications group with the ability to provide all of the 
modern communications products”.  57
 
3. Multi-channel Television 
DBS Satellite Services, known commercially as “yes”, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Bezeq that offers multi-channel satellite and online television transmissions (OTT). DBS’ OTT 
offering, called ‘STINGTV’, offers both video-on-demand (VOD) and digital terrestrial 
television content. ,  58 59
Funded by the Rothschild Foundation, television first came to Israel in an educational 
capacity in 1968. This relatively late introduction was the result of two factors related to early 
leaders' concerns about protecting the culture of the new state. Early statesmen were concerned 
that exposure to Western lifestyles through television would create the desire for an unattainable 
56 Schejter, Amit M. "Israeli cellular telecommunications policy." ​Telecommunications Policy​ 30 (2006). 
https://doi.org/10.1016. 
57 "Bezeq becomes 100% Owner of Pelephone." Bezeq Investor Relations. Last modified August 29, 2004. 
https://ir.bezeq.co.il/news-releases/news-release-details/bezeq-becomes-100-owner-pelephone.  
58 VOD refers to media distribution through which viewers can choose which programs they would like to 
view at any time. VOD can also be accessed without a traditional satellite television. Examples familiar to American 
readers include Netflix and entertainment systems on airplanes.  
59 DTT refers to a technology by which digital signals are broadcast from land-based (rather than satellite) 
television stations by radio waves.  
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standard of living. Additionally, the deluge of foreign language programming threatened to 
undermine the project of establishing modern Hebrew as the common language of a multiethnic 
population. Eventually, the state-run Israeli Broadcast Authority (IBA) began sharing a channel 
with the educational television (IETV). Even as the world moved to color television, the IBA 
removed color from its broadcasts. Again, the government’s logic was that color TV would be 
unfairly aspirational for the populace. Although the Supreme Court ruled in 1978 that the 
practice violated rights, the episode was a striking example of both the government’s paternal 
ethos and its ability to impose its will. Multichannel television picked up in the mid-1990s, with 
the new channels attracting viewership from minority communities who the secular, Ashkenazi 
government operators had not catered to.   60
DBS Satellite was founded in 2000 and serviced customers through the AMOS-2 and 
AMOS-3 satellites. Today, the Israeli market is dominated by yes, a satellite provider, and HOT, 
a cable provider that entered the market in 2003. Bezeq built its stake in DBS gradually, 
eventually exercising warrants in 2004 to become the company’s largest shareholder.  In March 61
2015, Bezeq acquired the remaining stake in the company from Eurocom DBS, in what would 
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4. International Communications 
Today Bezeq International’s revenue primarily comes from business internet and 
telecommunications services outside of Israel. The subsidiary acts as an internet-service-provider 
(ISP), network-equipment-provider (NEP), and offers infrastructure and communication 
technology (ICT) solutions. ,  The segment’s remaining revenue comes from voice services, 63 64
which enable international telecommunications.   65
Bezeq’s international telephony monopoly was dismantled relatively quickly. In July 
1997, the government allowed two new operators–Barak and Golden Line–to enter the market. 
Their services were priced significantly lower than Bezeq’s, leading Bezeq International to cut 
its own fees by more than 50%. Within the first three months of competition, Bezeq 
International’s share of the market fell from 100% to 60%.  The company began providing ISP 66
services to private and business customers abroad in late 2011, when its ‘Jonah’ submarine cable 
between Israel and Italy began operations.   67
 
The process of privatization 
As displayed in Exhibit 3, the process of privatization began in 1994, with the 
government listing 23% of the company on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.  In the same year, the 68
63 An NEP builds and maintains mobile, internet, and enterprise networks.  
64 Examples of ICT solutions include web hosting, maintenance and support of networks, cloud computing, 
and security and risk management services.  
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cellular monopoly was broken, as described above, with the Ministry of Communications 
granting Cellcom a license to operate. In 1997, the international monopoly was broken as well 
with the entrance of competitors Barak and Golden Line. However, it would take another four 
years to begin the process of deregulating the company’s domestic monopoly. Even after 
regulation to do so was passed, Bezeq exhibited strong market dominance and engaged in 




The Telecommunications Act of 1982 established Bezeq as a government-corporation, 
creating its monopoly. As prices began to climb without market-based competition to control 
them, the Knesset passed the Israel Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1988, which would 
become the basis of the country’s economic competition law. The policy introduced price caps, 
artificially reducing the cost of domestic phone service to consumers.   69




Nevertheless, Bezeq continued operating as a monopoly in domestic phone service, a 
dynamic that would not begin to change until 2001. While the program of privatization had made 
sense in the ideological fervor of 1985, in practice it was proved to be more difficult. To 
disentangle Bezeq, Israel would have to overcome outcry from the Histadrut and variable 
political climates.  
By 1997, fiscal pressure had reignited the need for privatization. Then-prime minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu had run on a campaign that touted the free-market, but now that GDP 
growth was smaller than expected, Netanyahu needed new ways to finance the growing deficit. 
The slowdown was largely attributed to a reduction in the influx of immigrants. The economic 
boost of massive migration from the USSR was fading, resulting in less than expected tax 
revenue and tourism. To bridge the gap, Netanyahu sold 12.4% of Bezeq to Merrill Lynch in 
July. In response, the Histadrut promptly organized strikes involving 60,000 workers at ten 
government companies, 6,000 of which worked at Bezeq. But for all of strength the imagery of a 
general strike conveyed, the Histadrut knew that privatization itself could not be blocked. A few 
days later, the union resumed negotiations with Netanyahu, pushing to secure the maximum 
benefits and severance possible for employees who would be terminated after privatization, 
rather than seeking to block further sales.   70
Even as governments changed, privatization continued to be a priority. After beating 
Netanyahu in the 1999 elections, Ehud Barak and his administration inherited a list of proposed 
privatizations. El Al, the national airline, was planned to be the next project, but opposition from 
70 Schememann, Serge. "In Fight over Privatization, Netanyahu Wins a Round." ​The New York Times ​ (New 





Orthodox Jews, who feared a foreign or private-sector owner ignoring the ban on flying on the 
Shabbat, forced the plan to be abandoned. Next in line was Bezeq. By then, the telecom giant 
had come under criticism for being a costly and outdated monopoly–by 2000, both long-distance 
and cellular service had been opened to market forces; the general public could not understand 
why domestic service had not.  Bezeq appeared to be struggling; new competition in 71
international and cellular markets had forced the company to cut its workforce (and pay 
severance) for over two thousand workers, resulting in a net loss for the quarter. Even ignoring 
the one-time charges associated with the firings, a majority of profits came from domestic 
service, its last monopoly. To taxpayers, it appeared as though they were subsidizing a company 
that was only surviving by overcharging them.   72
As the state began to make progress in privatization, signs of economic concentration 
derailed the first significant attempt: an initial public offering. In early 2001, plans were made to 
list the government’s controlling stake on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. However, the listing, 
which would have earned up to two billion for the Israeli treasury and boosted the overall 
market, was scrapped after police arrested Gad Ze’evi, the man behind the Ze’evi Group, and 
Bezeq’s largest private shareholder. Soon intrigue around the arrest eclipsed the privatization 
plan. Security forces were concerned that Ze’evi had acted on behalf of an Uzbekistani 
immigrant with ties to the Russian mob. Concerns rose that the sale of one of Israel’s largest 
companies to such an actor would have resulted in an increasingly large share of the economy in 
71 Orme, William A., Jr. "Israel Loosens Telephone Monopoly's Grip." ​The New York Times ​ (New York, 
NY), September 5, 2000, International Business, 4. Accessed February 15, 2020. 
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a few, possibly foreign hands. Instead of the cash flow it had counted on, the government found 
itself facing a paper loss of $400 million following the drop in market capitalization that resulted 
from the scandal.   73
That September, the Knesset voted to proceed with privatization, but it appeared that the 
market had soured.  It would take another four years to find a buyer. In May 2005, the 74
government sold a 30.6% stake to the Apax-Saban-Arkin group, a syndicate made up of Apax 
Partners, the London-based private equity firm, Haim Saban, an Israeli media entrepreneur, and 
Mori Arkin, an Israeli pharmaceutical tycoon.   75
In theory, Bezeq was now a private actor in a competitive market. Indeed, the 
government had started to regulate away the company’s domestic telephone monopoly in 2001. 
But despite these measures, Bezeq continued to display monopolistic tendencies. In July 2001, 
just months after the Ze’evi scandal, the Knesset passed the 2001 Telecommunications Law. The 
law cancelled the policies that had given Bezeq exclusivity in providing fixed-line domestic 
telecommunications services and gave the Ministry of Communications the ability to grant 
licenses to competitors hoping to provide the same service. As the market opened up, Bezeq 76
was determined to hold on to its share.  
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 Since 1988, the Israel Antitrust Authority had declared two instances of abuse of power. 
In 1997, after losing its cellular monopoly, the company had engaged in “price obfuscation”, 
deliberately creating misleading advertising that inaccurately compared Bezeq’s plans to those of 
new rivals. These messages, coming from what had been up to that point Israel’s only cellular 
provider, were found to be both significant and harmful to new entrants. Following the opening 
of the domestic market, the company fell back on similar tactics. In 2007, Bezeq was accused of 
purposefully failing to reconnect the interface between its own network and that of a competitor, 
HOT Telecommunication Systems. As a result, HOT’s network was impaired for thirty-four 
hours, undermining customers’ confidence and its market position.   77
The mismatch between privatization and deregulation may have harmed consumers and 
competitors, but for the Apax-Saban-Arkin group, Bezeq’s continued market dominance was 
enormously profitable. In addition to benefiting from the lingering monopoly, the group grew the 
internet and cellular businesses while trimming losses from satellite television.  Packaging 78
Bezeq as the only telecommunications company capable of offering a “quadruple play” (cellular, 
domestic, internet, and satellite), the consortium advertised heavily throughout the country.  79
Over the 2005-2009 period, Bezeq saw a significant rise in annual revenue, even as domestic 
communications as a percent of sales plateaued ​(Exhibit 4) ​. The Apax-Saban-Arkin group exited 
the investment in 2009 by selling its stake to 012 Smile Communications, later renamed B 
77 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. ​Israel – Accession Report on 
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Communications. The approximately $1.8 billion transaction value translated to over 300% 
return for the consortium.   80
 
Exhibit 4.  81
 
 
In some sense, the sale had shifted the former government monopoly from the hands of 
one group of tycoons to another. Through the purchase of a controlling stake in Bezeq, Shaul 
Elovitch, brought the company into the Eurocom Group, a holding company involved in the 
manufacturing of telephone and cellular equipment, office machinery, and telecommunications. 
Elovitch financed nearly 85% of the 6.5 billion shekel transaction with debt, a level of leverage 
that would prove unsustainable and ultimately disastrous.   82
80 "Israel's 012 Smile to Buy Controlling Stake in Bezeq." ​DealBook​, October 26, 2009. 
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=292.  
81 Financials prior to 1999 are not reported as the Israel Company Law requiring public companies to report 
financial statements was passed in 1999.  
82 Rochvarger, Michael. "Rise and Fall of Telecom Tycoon at the Center of the Netanyahu Corruption 
Scandal." ​Haaretz ​ (Tel Aviv, Israel), February 22, 2018. 
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Recent indictments against Elovitch reveal how the scale and connections of the one-time 
monopoly were abused for the sake of personal profiteering. In 2018, the Israel Securities 
Authority began investigating the sale of Yes to Bezeq. Authorities found that Elovitch, who 
owned stakes in both yes and Bezeq, sold yes to Bezeq at a transaction value several times more 
than what independent valuations placed the true value at, in the process enriching him 
personally with over $32 million.  Over the course of his ownership, Elovitch directed 83
approximately $4 billion of Bezeq’s dividends to cover debt payments for other companies 
within the Eurocom Group. Doing so shaved down shareholder equity to just 12.8% of what it 
had been prior to the takeover.  84
Benjamin Netanyahu, who served as Minister of Communications in addition to his role 
as Prime Minister from 2014 to 2017, had approved the yes-Bezeq deal and would later press 
Elovitch for favors in return. Case 4000, for which Netanyahu has been indicted and is awaiting 
trial at the time of this writing, charges the politician with asking Elovitch to demand favorable 
press coverage of Netanyahu and his wife from the online news publication, Walla, which is 
owned by Bezeq. According to prosecutors, these demands increased around the 2013 and 2015 
elections.   85
If these charges touch a particular nerve with Israelis, it is because they support a larger 
narrative of rising economic concentration. The privatization of Bezeq, which resulted in one of 
the country’s largest companies falling in the hands of one wealthy individual can be understood 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/the-telecom-tycoon-at-the-heart-of-the-netanyahu-corruption-scandal-1.58449
59.  
83 Halbfinger, David M. "The Cases Against Netanyahu and a Decision to Indict."  
84 Rochvarger, Michael. "Bezeq's in a Free Fall, but Does Anyone Want to Buy It?" Haaretz (Tel Aviv, 
Israel), July 4, 2018. 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/bezeq-s-in-a-free-fall-but-does-anyone-want-to-buy-it-1.6242431. 
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within this larger context. As of 2017, the ten largest business groups in the economy held nearly 
30% of the total stock market value.  For the common citizen, this level of concentration results 86
in higher prices and fewer choices. In 2011, protestors filled the streets of Tel Aviv, demanding 
more affordable housing (Israel has the eighth highest cost of living in the world) and cheaper 
essential goods under the overall cry to ‘minimize social inequalities'. ,  Netanyahu responded 87 88
by establishing a ‘concentration committee’, but as the recent corruption cases against the prime 
minister himself indicate, there is still work left to be done.  
Today, cries against economic concentration cite privatization as the root cause of the 
crisis. But as Gazit and Sauer suggest, economic concentration in Israel is not because of 
privatization, but rather, because of incomplete privatization.  The story of Bezeq illustrates as 89
much. By waiting as long as 2001 to break the company’s most lucrative monopoly, the state 
allowed its market power to grow, resulting in inflated prices for consumers. Furthermore, the 
mismatch in timing between privatization and regulation resulted in the still-dominant company 
falling into private hands, where its scale and reach were used for corrupt applications. In 
transferring the country’s most important telecommunications asset from public to private hands, 
the state reduced its exposure to the company’s risk without protecting customers from the 
repercussions.  
 
86Gershgoren, Gitit Gur, Liza Teper, Guy Sabbah, and Efraim Fortgang. ​Developments in the Structure of 
Holdings in Israel's Capital Market 2010-2018​. July 2019. 
http://www.isa.gov.il/sites/ISAEng/Departments/Economic-research/Documents/Developments_in_the_Structure_of
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87 Surkes, Sue. "Monopoly nation: How a handful of firms control prices, hold Israelis ransom." ​The Times 
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https://www.timesofisrael.com/monopoly-nation-how-a-handful-of-firms-control-prices-hold-israelis-to-ransom/.  
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Mekorot – Minority sale of a government company 
"The history of Jewish settlement in the country is, first and foremost, the story of the search, 
discovery and exploitation of new water sources".  
– Moshe Sharet, Former Israeli Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 
 
The politics of water  
Water in Israel has historically held a great deal of political significance, making the 
water infrastructure that serves the country particularly important as a source of national pride 
and security.  As the first Jewish settlers came to mandatory Palestine, claiming territory was the 
most important objective. As previously mentioned, population dispersion was critical both for 
laying claim to the land and for national security; a concentrated population was more vulnerable 
to attacks.  
The geography of mandatory Palestine would complicate this task. The area of land that 
makes up contemporary Israel and the occupied territories extends from the fertile north, which 
contains water sources, to the arid Negev Desert in the south.  In mandatory Palestine, as 90
throughout the rest of the Middle East, water scarcity was a fact of life. Nearly 60% of 
contemporary Israel’s territory is considered arid or semi-arid.  Moreover, early settlers formed 91
kibbutzim ​and ​moshavot​, primarily agricultural communities that required irrigation to cultivate 
90 Alatout, Samer. "Locating the Fragments of the State and Their Limits: Water Policymaking in Israel 
during the 1950s." Israel Studies Forum 23, no. 1 (2008): 40-65. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41805208. 
91 Sitton, Dov, Dr. "FOCUS on Israel: Development of Limited Water Resources-Historical and 





crops. Providing water for these settlers throughout the ​yishuv​ would require reliable 
infrastructure.  
 
Securing a national water source 
The project of water infrastructure was particularly urgent given that the early Zionist 
project could not rely on its neighbors for assistance. This emphasis on self-sufficiency was 
inculcated by Zionist ideology and later reinforced by hostility from Arab states. Consequently, 
centralized water infrastructure preceded Israeli statehood. Mekorot (“sources” in Hebrew) was 
formed in 1937 and owned collectively by three Zionist institutions, the Jewish National Fund, 
the Palestine Land Development Corporation, and the Nir Corporation.  The company drew 92
water from three wells in the valley of Jezreel, and through a system of metal pipes kept under 
pressure, two concrete tanks, and two open reservoirs, was able to provide reliable water.   93
As early as the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, water infrastructure proved to be a security 
concern. Early into the conflict, Jerusalem was besieged, cutting off Jewish inhabitants of the 
city from the rest of the newly-recognized nation. Anticipating the situation, Mekorot conducted 
“Operation Delivery”, using a twenty-kilometer-long pipe to divert water from the Jordan River 
into the city.   94
In 1949, following the close of the 1948 war, the state purchased shares of Mekorot 
previously owned by the Zionist organizations, turning the organization into a government 
92 Paz-Fuchs, Amir, Ronen Mandelkern, and Itzhak Galnoor, eds. ​The Privatization of Israel.  
93 Sitton, Dov, Dr. "FOCUS on Israel: Development of Limited Water Resources-Historical and 
Technological Aspects." 




company. Ten years later, the 1959 Water Law would codify water as a public good and task 
Mekorot with pumping, transporting, and distributing the resource.   95
Mekorot’s primary project was developing the National Water Carrier, completed in 
1964. Beginning in the mid 1940s, American scientists began publishing work about possible 
water infrastructure in the region. Work by W.K Lowdermilk, J.B. Hays, and J.S. Cotton all 
contributed to the first blueprints for the National Water Carrier.  The original plan was to 96
convey water from the Jordan River to the Negev Desert. Construction began in 1953, but was 
met with artillery fire from Syrian forces. The United Nations resolution that followed blocked 
Israel from continuing the construction, due to the veto of the USSR.  Construction then shifted 97
to tap water from the Sea of Galilee. Today, the National Water Carrier supplies about 1.5 billion 
cubic meters of water annually, serving about 7 million end users. In addition to providing water 
for Israelis, Mekorot also provides water to the Palestinian Authority and to Jordan, tying water 
distribution to Israeli foreign policy.   98
The National Water Carrier succeeded in making productive agriculture possible in the 
Negev and improving quality of life in previously drought-prone areas. However, redistributing 
water did not solve the area’s water troubles. With limited freshwater sources, scarcity continued 
to be a perennial issue. Beginning with a cabinet decision in 2000, the country has built 
95 "The Water Law of 1959." Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last modified December 22, 1998. 
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numerous desalination plants, primarily in the south of the country.  Unlike Mekorot, most of 99
these plants have been developed through public-private-partnerships between the government 
and entrepreneurs.  
While Mekorot has continued to emphasize that desalination is not a perfect solution and 
that water conservation is still critical, desalination has been critical  in meeting Israel’s water 
needs.  Today, nearly 70% of Israeli drinking water is from desalination plants.  The 100 101
introduction of desalination has reduced the need for water to be pumped north to south from the 
Sea of Galilee. In fact, Mekorot stopped pumping water from the sea in 2013.  Recently, a 102
historic drought in Israel’s north has incited Mekorot to change the direction of the National 
Water Carrier, pumping from south to north. In 2017, more water evaporated from the Sea of 
Galilee than entered the body, a phenomenon that had not occurred in 97 years.  The dropping 103
sea level prompted a plan to reverse the flow of the National Water Carrier, instead pumping 
water from desalination plants in the south into the Sea of Galilee in the north. The plan, costing 
around $30 million, will effectively turn the Sea of Galilee into a freshwater reservoir.  The 104
nature of the project, adapting water infrastructure to balancing variable natural conditions, 
reflects the coordination and efficiency of the Israeli system.  
99 "Background - Seawater Desalination in Israel." Israel Ministry of Finance. 
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But the system that has been crucial to managing Israel’s water needs may not remain 
government-owned forever. Picking up on his privatization plans articulated when he served as 
finance minister in the early 2000s, Benjamin Netanyahu put forward a new proposal to sell 
105 "Mekorot's Involvement in the Israeli Occupation." Who Profits: The Israeli Occupation Industry. Last 
modified December 2013. https://whoprofits.org/flash-report/mekorots-involvement-in-the-israeli-occupation/.  
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stakes in government-owned companies in 2014. The plan proposed selling a variety of 
government companies, including Israel Natural Gas Lines, Israel Post, Israel Military Industries, 
the port of Ashdod, the port of Haifa, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense 
Systems, and Israel Electric Corporation, in addition to Mekorot. Altogether, the sales were 
expected to bring in $4.1 billion over the course of the following three years, which would then 
go towards paying down the deficit.  The abrupt three-year timeline turned out to be overly 106
ambitious, especially given how prolonged the privatization of Bezeq was. While the 
government did sell Israel Military Industries to Elbit Systems in 2018, three years after the 
targeted date, other privatizations lost momentum. At the end of the period, Mekorot, Rafael 
Advanced Defense Systems, and Israel Aerospace Industries, among others, remained in 
government hands.   107
As of 2017, the Government Corporation Authority started to pick back up on the plan, 
reportedly planning IPOs of minority stakes in five government companies: Israel Aerospace 
Industries, Mekorot, Israel Post, and the ports of Haifa and Ashdod. In accordance with the 
original plan, the IPOs will only sell up to 49% stakes of the companies, retaining majority 
control to preserve the state’s long-term interest.  In the case of Bezeq, the state had no 108
long-term interest in controlling telecommunications networks. In that market, fully privatizing 
the former state monopoly eventually did lead to lower prices for consumers, even if the halting 
privatization process itself allowed the company to hold on to market power for longer than it 
106 Cohen, Tova, and Steven Scheer. "Israel approves $4 billion privatization plan for next three years." 
Reuters ​.https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-privatisation/israel-approves-4-billion-privatization-plan-for-next-t
hree-years-idUSKCN0HU0RA20141005.  






should have. However, full privatization in the case of Mekorot would not be prudent given that 
water is fundamentally a national security issue.  
Water conflict in the region began to escalate in the 1950s, when nations bordering the 
Jordan River Valley began diverting its water to meet their populations’ needs. In 1951, Jordan 
announced a plan to divert part of the Yarmouk River, the largest tributary of the Jordan River, 
in order to irrigate the East Ghor region. Two years later, Israel began construction on the 
National Water Carrier. Armed skirmishes at construction sites in both nations attracted 
international attention, leading President Eisenhower’s special envoy Eric Johnston to draft the 
1955 Johnston Plan. The plan allocated water from the Jordan River to the interested nations, 
directing that 55% should be allocated to Jordan, 36% to Israel, and 9% to each Syria and 
Lebanon. Arab states swiftly rejected the proposal; the United States’ continued economic and 
military aid to Israel since 1948 had undermined its credibility as a neutral third party. A United 
Nations resolution ruled against Israel, shifting the construction of the National Water Carrier to 
the Sea of Galilee, which also borders Syria.  
The completion of the National Water Carrier led to the Arab Summit in 1964, the first 
meeting of the Arab League. In response to the Israeli water carrier, the League devised the 
Headwater Diversion Plan, which would divert two of the three sources of the Jordan River, the 
Hasbani and the Banias, to prevent them flowing into the Sea of Galilee. Israeli forces attacked 
the new construction in Syria in a series of conflicts that would contribute to another Arab-Israeli 
war in 1967. Indeed, in the aftermath of the war, in addition to taking control of the Golan 
Heights, West Bank, and Gaza Strip, Israel destroyed the Syrian diversion project. Only two 
years later, in 1969, Israel attacked the Jordanian East Ghor Canal over suspicions that Jordan 
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was diverting more than its share of water. This time, both nations agreed to abide by the 1955 
Johnston Plan and received American water aid.   109
While conflict between the Arab League and Israel have mellowed, water rights continue 
to be a significant political and ethical issue for Palestinian-Israeli relations. Following 1967, 
Israel either confiscated or destroyed the majority of Palestinian irrigation pumps on the Jordan 
River. While Israeli settlers drilled new irrigation wells as they moved into the occupied 
territories, Palestinian farmers were forbidden from drilling their own wells.  It was not until 110
the second Oslo Accords in 1995 that Palestinian water rights were even recognized. Oslo II 
established the Joint Water Commission to supervise water distribution, with Mekorot delivering 
water to the Palestinian Authority, which is responsible for distribution through its own 
networks.  111
 
Water diplomacy in Palestine 
For Israel, water policy has become more than an issue of supporting the nation’s own 
population. Scholars have made the argument that Mekorot has intentionally drilled new wells in 
order to deplete Palestinian water resources, forcing Palestinians to rely on Israeli water 
infrastructure. Since 1968, Mekorot has drilled at least fourteen new wells in the West Bank in 
order to provide water to Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. While Israeli settlements 
have been declared illegal by the United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Security 
109 United Nations. "Israel: International Water Issues." Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/Profile_segments/ISR-IntIss_eng.stm.  
110 Ibid. 
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Council, and International Court of Justice, having Mekorot, a government-company, create the 
infrastructure to support them is in effect tacit state-approval.  Moreover, these wells have been 112
located such that they deplete water sources that would have otherwise gone to Palestinian wells. 
While Palestinian villages are given access to Mekorot’s infrastructure, by accepting, they cede 
their independence. If Palestinians are dependent on Israel for something as fundamental as 
water, their ability to survive as a separate community–let alone separate nation–is undermined. 
Perhaps even more importantly, if they do not control the water, they cannot cultivate or control 
the land.   113
The geographic realities of the Middle East mean that water scarcity will always be a 
prominent geopolitical issue for every state in the region. Israel, primarily through Mekorot, has 
crafted water policy and infrastructure to manage its water consumption in a sustainable way. 
Given Mekorot’s expansive network of water infrastructure that supplies Israel as well as parts of 
the occupied territories and Jordan, the government-company’s trajectory will continue to be tied 
to Israel’s political ambitions in the region. When weighing the tradeoffs between public sector 
and private sector risk for Mekorot, long-term national security and foreign policy concerns must 
be tantamount. Through the sale of a minority stake, the government can generate a substantial 
cash inflow and reduce the burden of financing the company while continuing to control its 
operations and vision. In developing infrastructure for a resource as politically sensitive as water 
is in Israel, the state must protect its role as the decision-maker.  
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Desalination Plants – Utilizing public-private partnerships 
"There are two factors here: one is God, who brings whatever rain he does. In the last few years 
he’s been a little disappointing. The other is whatever water sources we can develop ourselves."  
– Uri Saguey, Former Chairman of Mekorot   114
 
Born out of necessity, Israel’s desalination program is perhaps the most robust in the 
world. In developing it through public-private partnerships, the state leveraged the expertise of 
the private sector while effectively shifting all short-term risk to private companies. The 
country’s desalination plants have been structured to incentivize efficiency while still providing 
Israel with the water output it needs.  
 
A natural crisis 
Since its inception, Israel has always been acutely aware of water distress. The country 
ranks 10th in the lowest levels of renewable freshwater resources per capita, severely 
constricting its ability to tap its national resources . Historically, necessity has prompted 115
innovation, as seen with the National Water Carrier, which successfully hydrated water-poor 
regions. The country’s water recycling infrastructure has been similarly effective: 86% of 
wastewater is reused for irrigation. In context, Spain, the second-most wastewater efficient 
114Orme, William A., Jr.  "Israel Raises Its Glass To Desalination; Water, Water Everywhere Just Waiting 
For Price to Drop." ​The New York Times ​, June 23, 2001, International Business. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/23/business/international-business-israel-raises-its-glass-desalination-water-wate
r.html.  




country in the world, recycles just 19% of its wastewater.  But even after optimizing for 116
distribution and recycling, Israel still found itself falling nearly half a billion cubic meters short 
of its annual freshwater needs.   117
The situation became particularly precarious in the early 2000s, when a series of droughts 
lowered the water level of the Sea of Galilee. Desalination appeared to be the best path forward: 
in 2000 a cabinet decision authorized desalination plants, and five years later the first plant was 
completed in Ashkelon. As of 2018, nearly 585 million cubic meters of water are desalinated 
annually in Israel. The five plants contribute in the following amounts:  
Exhibit 6.   118
 
 
All five plants use the reserve osmosis method of desalination. The traditional 
evaporation process evaporates seawater and passes it through a series of chambers, leaving 
behind salt in each stage. The vapor is then condensed, resulting in desalinated water. 
Evaporating water takes a great deal of energy, making it infeasible in regions with high energy 
costs. The reverse osmosis method passes seawater through a semipermeable membrane that 
116 Jacobsen, Rowan. "Israel Proves the Desalination Era Is Here." Scientific American. Last modified July 
29, 2016. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/israel-proves-the-desalination-era-is-here/.  
117 Ibid.  
118 "Background - Seawater Desalination in Israel." Israel Ministry of Finance. 
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prevents salt from passing through. The use of a membrane rather than multiple state changes 
makes the process much less expensive.   119
 
Risk transfer to the private sector 
The success of these desalination plants in tiding over Israel’s water needs is in part due 
to the financing and ownership decisions made in their development. By tapping private sector 
expertise while maintaining government oversight through public-private partnerships, the Israeli 
model of financing desalination plants has incentivized operational efficiency while maintaining 
quality standards and reliable output volumes.  
All of the plants were financed and developed through public-private partnerships, 
cooperative structures between the private sector and the government designed to limit each 
participant’s risk exposure. ​With the exception of the Palmachim plant, which was developed 
through the build-operate-own (BOO) method, Israel’s desalination plants were developed 
through build-operate-transfer (BOT) plans ​(Exhibit 6) ​. For the BOT plants, the government 
auctions a concession to a contractor who then builds and operates the plant for the next 25 
years. Over this time period, the concessionaire sells output to the government, making back its 
initial investment. At the end of the period, the ownership of the plant transfers to the 
government. Under the BOO model, the private company retains ownership of the asset 







Overview of Desalination Plant Concession Terms  120
 
 
For the government, the primary attraction of these projects is that they push the risk of 
the project almost entirely to the private sector while still gaining access to desalinated water. 
Without private sector participation, the state would have to build, finance, and operate the plant 
on its own, taking on the risks of financial and operational failures. Getting a private company to 
120 The State of Israel. "Background - Seawater Desalination in Israel." Ministry of Finance. 
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develop the asset eliminates these risks. As these concessionaires undertake massive greenfield 
projects, the required construction, equipment, and labor expenditures stimulate economic 
growth, all without increasing the government’s short term deficit.  Moreover, by involving the 121
private sector, these projects could build on the concessionaire’s previous operating knowledge, 
which would be faster and more efficient than a government agency starting from scratch. For 
instance, by the time the Ashkelon plant was commissioned, one of its shareholders, IDE 
Technologies, had already commissioned the Gujarat Reliance Project in India (1998) and the 
Sarlux desalination plant in Italy (1999).  Leveraging such knowledge was especially critical 122
given that the success or failure of desalination would have very real consequences for Israel’s 
water security. By utilizing public-private partnerships, the government becomes the buyer of a 
resource rather than the seller and operator.  
On the other hand, the concessionaire makes the tradeoff between significant upfront 
capital expenditures and a guaranteed stream of income. In addition to building the plant, the 
concessionaire arranges its financing, operations, and maintenance. In exchange for taking on all 
these risks, concessionaires are guaranteed payments for the life of the contract term from the 
government, or in the case of Israel, Mekorot, a government company. The construction costs of 
these projects are typically financed 80% through debt, with the remaining 20% coming from the 
equity stake of the concessionaire. As such, the concessionaire is at the bottom of the capital 
structure. This structure incentives lenders to monitor the practices of the concessionaire and the 
121 OECD-WWC-Netherlands Roundtable on Financing Water. ​Attracting Private Funding through Public 
Finance: A Case Study of Desalination of Sea Water in Israel​. By Yitsik Marmelshtein. 2017. 
https://www.oecd.org/env/resources/Marmelshtein%20(2017)%20Attracting%20private%20funding%20--%20desal
ination%20Israel.pdf.  
122 "Our Projects." IDE Technologies. https://www.ide-tech.com/en/our-projects/.  
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project since repayment of the debt depends on the project’s success. It also incentives the 
concessionaire to operate as efficiently as possible, since the equity payout will be last.   123
Still, the model is not perfect. For one, the transaction costs associated with running a 
process to select a concessionaire and writing an effective contract would not be present if the 
public sector developed the plants itself. Moreover, by contracting out the plants, the state is 
effectively ceding control over crucial public infrastructure. While Mekorot is still involved in 
overseeing the concessionaire’s output during the concession period, leaving huge volumes of 
water supply to the private sector is still a risk. Left in private hands, the project also faces higher 
funding costs since a private company will not be able to borrow at rates as low as the 
government would be able to.  
Structurally, desalination plants are organized as special purpose companies, with which 
each involved party then contracts with ​(Exhibit 7) ​. The tender process typically takes one year, 
during which qualified bidders are identified and then evaluated. Following the selection of a 
bidder, it takes another year to determine the financing structure of the project and reach a 
financial close. Construction of the plant itself takes between two to three years, with 
construction work either contracted out to external parties or completed by the concessionaire 
itself. After construction has completed, the plant is evaluated and receives a Permit to Operate, 
after which it may begin the desalination process. Throughout the period of the concession, 
Mekorot continually checks the concessionaire’s compliance with the contract terms regarding 
quality and quantity of water output.  124
123 OECD-WWC-Netherlands Roundtable on Financing Water. ​Attracting Private Funding through Public 




Exhibit 7.  125
 
 
While the five major desalination plants were built through public-private partnerships, 
Mekorot operates thirty-one small desalination plants, primarily in the south of the country.  126
Altogether, the desalination system in Israel has provided the country with reliable water output 
in a region where water is heavily politicized and rainfall from year to year is unreliable. The use 
of public-private partnerships has contributed to the success of desalination. By creating 
structures that align financial incentives, the public-private partnership model tapped into the 
innovation and expertise of private enterprise. These large-scale projects stimulated the economy 
without driving up a short-term deficit. Most importantly, the state secured water resources while 
reducing its exposure to financial and operational risks.  
125 IDE Technologies. "PPP Contractual Structure." Chart. June 24, 2008. 
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University Press, 2010. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hj11w.36.  
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Israel and the Neoliberal State 
For an ideology once lauded as part of the ultimate destiny of mankind, neoliberalism has 
an imperfect legacy. In 2016, the International Monetary Fund itself admitted to the failings of 
the economic principles for which it had so ardently advocated. While economic neoliberalism 
succeeded in lifting millions out of poverty and increasing foreign investment and knowledge 
transfer, its failings should not be ignored. Most notably, (1) it is hard to establish a consistent 
pattern of economic improvement across all countries where policies were implemented, (2) 
neoliberal policies often achieved growth at the expense of increased inequality, and (3) the 
resulting inequality in turn stymies sustainable growth.   127
In Israel as well, inequalities have resulted. Discontent with the exorbitant cost of living 
led to mass protests in 2011, culminating in 400,000 Israelis demonstrating in Tel Aviv.  128
Protestors were mostly middle-class Israelis, who carry a disproportionate burden in regards to 
labor force participation, military service, and tax payments. More generally, the high cost of 
living is a symptom of an economic system hampered by concentration on the part of both 
companies and individuals, an example of what imperfectly implemented neoliberalism can do. 
In response to the protests, the economy became a dominant issue of Israeli politics. Since 2011, 
the situation has improved, with real wages up 6% in 2015. However, these changes may have 
more to do with depressed oil prices than systematic improvements. ,   129 130
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Even if Israelis are experiencing the pitfalls of inequality now, Israel as a whole has 
undoubtedly benefited from economic growth following the 1985 Stabilization Program. In 
academic literature and the voting booth, Israel’s turn toward economic liberalization is usually 
considered a success. Academic articles often extol the Israeli stabilization plan as an example of 
triumph in the face of hyperinflation. The Brookings Institution lauds Shimon Peres, who 
oversaw the Economic Stabilization Program as the ‘savior of the Israeli economy’.  Other 131
academics describe the program as a “a rare case of stable success under democratic auspices 
without major social disorder”.  Israelis today continue to benefit from the path the program set 132
for the country. For voters, continuing that economic prosperity is one of the most pressing 
political issues. Neoliberal policies truly intensified under Benjamin Netanyahu, who as Finance 
Minister and later as Prime Minister pushed policies to reduce the role of the public sector by (1) 
privatizing state assets and (2) cutting subsidies and welfare programs. Since he took office in 
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weighed down by oil, than with improvements in purchasing power.  
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Exhibit 8.  133
 
 
The wealth created by Netanyahu’s policy decisions has uplifted the Israeli economy as a whole, 
even if it has been distributed unequally. For many Israelis, even those who object to Likud’s 
stances on national security and religion, Netanyahu’s economic track record looks like a 
winning bet.  The allure of continued economic prosperity is so strong that even after multiple 134
indictments on corruption charges for Netanyahu, Likud finished with the most seats in the 
March 2020 elections.  Academic praise for Israel’s economic liberalization seems to reflect 135
the reality on the ground: neoliberal policies set Israel on a rosier path than the one it was facing 
in the 1980s. This is certainly true in the case of infrastructure. By approaching infrastructure 
133 "GDP growth (annual %)." The World Bank. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.  
134 Srivastava, Mehul. "Israelis learn to stomach Netanyahu as a solid economy lifts spirits." ​Financial 
Times ​, April 2, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/6e3c7c90-54bd-11e9-91f9-b6515a54c5b1.  




privatization through different methods, Israel reduced the state’s financial burden while 
preserving its long-term interests.  
Of the cases studied in this paper, Bezeq is the least successful. In that case, the failure of 
neoliberalism was not in ideology but in application. ​By the time Israel was looking at selling 
Bezeq, beginning in the mid-1990s, it was clear that the government’s ownership of the company 
in the near-term was not necessary to meet the long-term objective of reliable 
telecommunications services. The private sector had developed enterprises capable of bridging 
the gap that had once existed. In most of Bezeq’s subsegments, the state began to disentangle 
itself, granting licenses to competitors in international communications, cellular 
communications, and multi-channel television. But the lucrative domestic telephony monopoly 
was not broken until after the company had begun its privatization process, leaving a dominant 
company in private hands. The decision to privatize was aligned with the new reality of the 
telecommunications market. However, incomplete privatization left barriers in place, leading to 
concentration.  
In the case of Mekorot, the state maintained its control over Israel’s water supply to meet 
the dual goals of (1) serving the population’s needs and (2) supporting claims to geopolitically 
critical freshwater resources. In the pre-state community, control of water supplies was critical to 
settling across a wide geographical area and cultivating successful, self-sufficient agricultural 
communities. Developing and maintaining water infrastructure was critical to early 
state-building much in the same way that developing an army was. Today, decades after the 
major armed conflicts surrounding water in the region, water continues to be a major issue for 
Israel. As a government company, Mekorot is able to organize the entire nation’s water needs at 
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scale, prioritizing access and coordination in a way that a collection of private companies trying 
to achieve the same goal would likely not be able to. As a result, Mekorot’s water reclamation 
efforts and the construction of the National Water Carrier have made great strides in managing 
the scarce resource. Moreover, Mekorot’s water prowess has been useful in navigating the 
politics of Palestinian relations. Mekorot itself was created on the principle that the nation must 
have independent access to a scarce resource if it hoped to survive among hostile neighbors. If 
work published in ​The Journal of Palestine Studies ​is correct, Mekorot seems to be applying the 
same logic to undermine Palestinian independence.  136
Because of the nation’s geography, it has always been, and will always be, important for 
the state of Israel to maintain its control over the collection and distribution of water. The current 
proposal to privatize Mekorot would maintain a 51% ownership stake for the state. As long as a 
privatization plan maintains the state’s decision-making authority, it should continue to be 
aligned with Israel’s long-term interest.  
With desalination plants, the long-term objective is the same: to ensure consistent 
freshwater supplies. In the short-term, however, as long as reliable output continues, the state has 
no clear interest in owning or operating the plants themselves. Public-private partnerships make 
sense in this context because they localize the private sector risk to a guaranteed payback period 
while meeting the criteria of the state: reliable output in the short-term and possession in the 
long-term.  
Globally, neoliberal economic policy has a mixed reputation, at best. Even within Israel, 
its results are not perfect. Privatization and a shrinking public sector have achieved economic 
136 "The West Bank's Water." ​Journal of Palestine Studies ​ 7, no. 4 (1978): 175-79. 
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growth at the expense of social services and income equity. Nevertheless, Israelis today still 
seem to buy into the economic vision first articulated in 1985. Economic growth since 
stabilization has seen the country prosper and has raised the standard of living far above what 
early settlers could have imagined. Today, critiques of neoliberal theorists and their policy 
recommendations abound. In the Israeli case, those theorists may find some vindication. 
 
Appendix: Applicability of the Israeli Case to the United States 
Collectivism versus individualism 
If a similar story were told for the United States, it would unfold very differently. Early in 
Israel’s history, the ability to centralize was a key driver of success in establishing and securing 
the community. A powerful government was necessary to organize political, logistical, and 
military efforts for the survival of the population. In the United States, on the other hand, 
founders were deeply opposed to strong centralization. Founding documents such as the US 
Constitution and Bill of Rights emphasize individual rights. Culturally, individualism is 
foundational to American identity. This idea was in part responsible for the country’s early 
approach to infrastructure. From the start, private investment was a significant contributor to 
national development.  
 
Telecommunications: regulation through prosecution 
In telecommunications, the United States government managed public risk through 
regulation rather than ownership. From Alexander Graham Bell’s telephone patent in 1876 to a 
powerful antitrust suit in 1983, the Bell Company, which would become American Telegraph & 
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Telephone (AT&T) in 1885, dominated American telecommunications. The Department of 
Justice took its first swing at the monopoly in 1913 with an antitrust suit. At the time, Congress 
had toyed with the idea of nationalizing the telephone network in the public interest. Ultimately, 
however, AT&T settled with prosecutors, agreeing to the Kingsbury Commitment. In the 
settlement, AT&T agreed to let independent local telephone companies connect to its long 
distance network and promised not to complete acquisitions opposed by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.  The Kingsbury Commitment was a seminal manifestation of the American 137
attitude towards infrastructure development: it aimed to maintain widespread, equitable access 
for Americans while leaving the operations to the private sector.  
Still, AT&T and the Bell System dominated the marketplace. Local operators bought 
telephones and related equipment from Western Electric, a wholly owned subsidiary of AT&T, 
which dominated 90% of the market. In addition, the operators paid licensing fees to Bell 
Laboratories, the company’s research and development arm.  Through this vertically integrated 138
model, AT&T still effectively operated a monopoly. By 1956, AT&T was the largest 
privately-held company in the world: it owned 98% of long-distance telephone services facilities 
and 85% of short-distance telephone services facilities.  Aside from market competition, the 139
company’s scale and influence prompted another concern for regulators. Bell Labs had been an 
indispensable contributor to American scientific knowledge. In addition to developments in 
telephony terminals, transmission, and operations, innovation at Bell Labs had led to inventions 
137Griffin, Jodie. "100th Anniversary of the Kingsbury Commitment." Public Knowledge. Last modified 
December 19, 2013. https://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/100th-anniversary-of-the-kingsbury-commitment/.  
138 Watzinger, Martin, Thomas A. Fackler, Markus Nagler, and Monika Schnitzer. "How antitrust 





such as the transistor, information theory, laser, solar cell, and fiber-optic communications.  140
The risk of one company potentially hoarding new knowledge of was deeply problematic. The 
government’s antitrust suit in 1956 was aimed at these perceived inequities and was settled 
through consent decrees. These agreements mandated that Bell license lower its royalty fees of 
1%-6% on patents to zero and make licenses available to interested parties without a bargaining 
process.  141
Despite the punitive consent decrees, AT&T continued to display anticompetitive 
behavior throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, the government decided that the company was 
too large to effectively regulate. In 1983, regulators broke up the Bell System by breaking up 
AT&T. Bell Labs and Western Electric remained under the AT&T umbrella while the regional 
Bell operating companies and providers of local phone service formed a new company, Bellcore.  
The United States has allowed private enterprise and innovation to drive its 
telecommunications sector. In that sense, it has never had to deal with the privatization of a 
public monopoly like Israel did with Bezeq. But despite their differences in ownership, Bezeq 
and AT&T acted in similar ways. At different points in time, both companies were monopolies 
in their respective markets that used anticompetitive practices to cling to market power even as 
their government tried to open their markets to competition. In policing these markets, each 
government had to continually evaluate the public interest it was protecting.  
As a network-based industry, telecommunications requires high capital expenditures, 
creating huge barriers to entry. Armed with scale, the incumbent quickly gains the advantage, 
140 National Research Council. "Renewing U.S. Telecommunications Research." ​The National Academies 
Press ​, 2006. https://doi.org/10.17226/11711.  
141 Watzinger, Martin, Thomas A. Fackler, Markus Nagler, and Monika Schnitzer. "How antitrust 
enforcement can spur innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 consent decree." 
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even if it does not provide the best service or most competitive prices.  Both AT&T and Bezeq 142
illustrate this. Unlike Bezeq, AT&T’s monopoly was not mandated by the government, but its 
ability to scale early crushed competitors’ chances. In Israel, once Bezeq’s monopolies were 
broken by regulation, prices fell dramatically. Under this industry dynamic, an unregulated 
market, as in the United States, as well as a government-mandated monopoly will undercut 
competition.  
 
Water: decentralized organization 
American water infrastructure, like telecommunications, developed in a decentralized 
way, with municipalities making their own decisions regarding privatization. In addition to a 
cultural attitude inherently skeptical of large, centralized authority, the American system had 
other distinctions that led it down a different path than Mekorot in Israel. For one, water does not 
carry the same degree of political importance in the United States as it does in Israel. Land area 
is an obvious factor: the United States has 8,851 renewable internal freshwater resources per 
capita in cubic meters compared to Israel’s 91.  Moreover, the United States does not compete 143
heavily with its neighbors for shared resources the way Israel does. Given the United States’ 
relative size–over 400 times larger than Israel in terms of land area–it would likely not be 
feasible or efficient to build and maintain a central water infrastructure system.  
As colonists arrived in North America, various communities made their own decisions 
about how to build water infrastructure. In 1772, Rhode Island contracted two private water 
142 Dichter, Alex, Ekaterina Khvatova, and Corrado Sala. "Sizing the advantages of incumbency." 
McKinsey & Company. Last modified October 2012. 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/sizing-the-advantages-of
-incumbency.  
143 "Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters)." The World Bank.  
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delivery companies for its supplies. New York used private wells as its main water source and 
eventually established a private water company, the Manhattan Company, to organize the city’s 
water needs. By the middle of the 19th century, 50 of the country’s 83 water systems were 
privately owned. By the end of the century, the country had over 3,000 systems, half of which 
were privately owned.   144
The trend towards decentralization increased as the country’s population expanded 
westward. Today, there are 148,000 public water systems that together serve 90% of Americans.
 These systems can be either publicly owned by a municipality/city or privately owned by a 145
company. The diversity of climates and political environments these water systems exist in has 
resulted in various levels of quality, with many systems still using pipes from the 1800s.  146
Overall, the American Society of Civil Engineers has awarded drinking water infrastructure in 
the United States grades varying between D-minus and D for over a decade. By the Society’s 
estimates, $1 trillion in investment will be needed to service drinking water demand over the 
next 25 years.  As this money is raised and spent, it is critical to think about how projects 147
should balance public and private risk going forward. In doing so, the Israeli model could hold 
powerful lessons.  
144 "History of US Water and Wastewater Systems." In ​Privatization of Water Services in the United States: 
An Assessment of Issues and Experience​, 29-40. The National Academies Press, 2002. 
https://www.nap.edu/read/10135/chapter/4.  
145 "Drinking Water Requirements for States and Public Water Systems." United States Environmental 
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146 “How Development of America's Water Infrastructure Has Lurched through History." The PEW 
Charitable Trusts. Last modified March 3, 2019. 
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While it is not feasible or necessary to apply a nationally centralized system like 
Mekorot’s to the United States, Israel’s management of desalination plants may provide a useful 
framework for involving the private sector in water infrastructure. Currently, American water 
systems have employed privatization unevenly, with mixed results. Studies have found that 
investor-owned utilities typically charge 59% more for water service and 63% more for sewage 
service than local government utilities.  In these cases there appears to be a mismatch in the 148
public’s long-term interest and the short-term application of policy. While these private owners 
are providing citizens clean and reliable drinking water, it is not clear that they are the most 
efficient vehicle to do so. A better model might mimic the public-private partnerships utilized by 
Israel, whereby the local government contracts with a private enterprise for water treatment. This 
model would still leverage private sector innovation, but could modulate rates since the authority 
in charge of price setting would not be motivated by profit maximization.  
 
The future of infrastructure spending 
The next decade will be transformative for infrastructure globally. In the United States, 
the recent coronavirus pandemic will likely accelerate the speed and scale of federal 
infrastructure spending. In March of 2020, President Donald Trump expressed enthusiasm for 
infrastructure spending, especially in light of near-zero interest rates, calling for up to two trillion 
in investment.  New infrastructure spending would act as a stimulus, which, in addition to other 149
148 "Water Privatization: Facts and Figures." Food & Water Watch. Last modified August 31, 2015. 
https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/insight/water-privatization-facts-and-figures.  
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packages such as Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, might help 
revive a stalled economy once the pandemic is under control. Calls for infrastructure spending 
will likely win bipartisan support: “nation-building” carries political points for both parties. 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and House Democrats have revived a $760 billion bill introduced in 
January that would include money for highways, bridges, alternative vehicle charging stations, 
airports, wastewater, broadband, community health centers.  Concurrently, private 150
infrastructure investment has gained tremendous traction in recent years, with infrastructure 
funds raising a record-breaking $104 billion in 2018 followed by $97.3 billion in 2019.   151
As both public and private funds are deployed in the coming years, governments will 
inevitably have to consider the role of private enterprise in the operations of infrastructure assets 
the public depends upon. In Israel, as globally, privatizing core infrastructure requires a rigorous 
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